How did Moscow maintain its influence in Syria’s post-Assad era?
Since the overthrow of former Syrian President Bashar al Assad in December 2024 by armed factions led by Hay’at Tahrir al Sham, there has been a widespread belief that Russian influence in Syria is nearing its end.
With Ahmed al Sharaa assuming leadership of the country during the transitional phase, Western reports indicated that Russia’s military presence had become fragile and threatened.
Although Moscow was alarmed by the loss of its most prominent ally in the Middle East, and its media did not hide its disappointment, reality proved otherwise.
Russia didn’t withdraw, but rather strengthened its positions, particularly at the Tartus naval base and Hmeimim air base, and maintained its influence in northeastern Syria.
Russian diplomacy hastened to rebuild its relations with the new leadership in Damascus.
Given that a large portion of Syrians don’t view Russia as a sectarian force—as is the case with Iran—but rather as an international power with a history in the region, Sharaa welcomed cooperation with Moscow.
The new leadership in Syria has adopted a pragmatic policy toward Russia, seeking economic aid such as grain and energy, political support in international forums, and possibly future weapons.
Foreign Affairs reports that the Sharaa government is using its relationship with Russia as leverage over former regime loyalists and as a signal to the West that Syria has alternatives if aid is not forthcoming.
Russia isn’t just an unwanted guest in the new Syria, as in fact, there are regional and international parties that wish to maintain its presence, but for varying reasons:
Israel: It views Moscow as a force capable of curbing Iranian influence, and prefers its military presence over alternatives it may consider more threatening.
Türkiye: Hopes that Russia will help it confront the Kurds and remain a partner in mapping influence within Syria.
Syria Democratic Forces (SDF): Seeking to keep Russia in the picture in anticipation of a possible US withdrawal or pressure from Damascus to end its aspirations for autonomy.
Although European countries are skeptical of Russia’s presence, Foreign Affairs notes that it’s not in a position to dominate Syria’s future, especially given its preoccupation with the war in Ukraine and the depletion of its military and financial resources.
After Assad’s fall, Russia didn’t sever its ties with Damascus, instead, it quickly secured its military assets, transferred equipment from Tartus, and strengthened its presence in Hmeimim.
It also provided food and fuel aid and signaled its willingness to continue supporting Syria politically and economically.
Despite Western pressure, Moscow hasn’t left, but has sought to maintain its bases as logistical centers for its regional operations, particularly in Africa.
According to the new Syrian defense minister, the continued presence of Russian forces is welcome as long as it serves Syria’s interests, emphasizing that there are no permanent enemies in politics.
In the spring of 2025, the new Syria faced serious challenges: sectarian attacks on the coast, tribal clashes in the south, and continued Israeli escalation inside Syrian territory.
In this context, cooperation with Russia is a message to the West that Damascus does not rely solely on the Washington-Brussels axis.
This cooperation could be used to curb Israeli military moves or deter supporters of the former regime from undermining the transitional process.
Moscow, through its ties with Netanyahu, is said to be able to help calm the situation with Israel.
Israel, Türkiye, and the SDF all realize that a continued Russian presence could help stabilize the balance within Syria.
Israel, for example, prefers a weak, decentralized Syria, whose various authorities are easier to negotiate with.
Türkiye, on the other hand, desires Russian support for its position on the Kurds, while the SDF relies on Moscow as a fallback in the event that Washington abandons it.
It seems that everyone, despite their different goals, sees Russia as a player that can be employed to serve their interests.
Russia isn’t expected to return to its former dominant position in Syria.
However, it will remain a player among several, especially if it continues to play the role of mediator and limited military provider.
Without the necessary resources for reconstruction, Moscow won’t be a reliable economic partner.
The Arab Gulf states, Türkiye, Europe, and the United States will determine the course of Syria’s economic recovery, not the Kremlin.
According to experts, it would be a mistake to demand that the new Syrian leadership sever its ties with Russia, especially since these ties may be beneficial in some cases.
Instead, it advises Washington and its allies to adopt a long-term approach focused on supporting economic and political stability and providing real alternatives to Damascus.
The best way to ensure that Syria doesn’t become a platform for Russian influence in the future is simply to build a strong relationship with it today.
