Is there a shift in the Russian presence in Syria towards the east?

Over the past few months, Russia has begun a strategic repositioning of its forces, moving most of its units from the Hmeimim base in Latakia to Qamishli airport in northeastern Syria, an area under the control of the Syria Democratic Forces (SDF).

According to satellite imagery and field sources, Russian forces carried out more than 25 military flights between the two bases between January and June 2025, indicating an organized transfer of personnel and heavy equipment.

This translated into Russia establishing a presence in Qamishli as a new central military base.

The Russian shift wasn’t surprising to some, but rather it was taking place within direct understandings with the SDF leadership, in light of the declining coordination between the latter and the United States, and the faltering March 10 agreement with the Syrian government, which hasn’t been implemented.

In contrast, the new authorities in Damascus no longer welcome the presence of Russian forces at the Hmeimim base, especially after it was subjected to repeated attacks by armed groups described as close to the new government.

This prompted Moscow to seek a more stable and influential haven, choosing Qamishli as an alternative center.

Observers believe that the SDF is seeking, through its new alliance with Moscow, to secure military and political cover as an alternative to Washington, especially with the growing American voices calling for the dissolution of the SDF and its integration into a unified Syrian army.

In this context, Qamishli Airport has emerged as a strategic option for Russia, given its important geographical location at the intersection of the Turkish and Iraqi borders, in addition to its oil and gas resources.

To some experts, it seems like Moscow finds itself at a crossroads after the collapse of the Assad regime, as it become in two directions:

1. Either to withdraw from Syria.
2. Attempt to adapt to the new regime to maintain its influence.

And in this regard, it was obvious that Moscow has chosen the second option and has begun expanding its presence into areas outside Damascus’s control.

The seemingly Russian shift towards Qamishli isn’t only a military option, but also a political step to impose a new reality on the ground, in cooperation with local forces, particularly former Syrian officers who still have influence and a desire to coordinate with Moscow.

Damascus’s weakness is an opportunity for Moscow, as in the light of the Syrian state weakness and division within the central authority, especially in southern Syria and Sweida, even in the coastal region to some point, has opened the door for the Russia to consolidate presence in the east, amid a weak security environment.

Moscow sees the Kurds as potential partners in light of their disappointment with fluctuating US policies, especially since Washington abandoned them under President Donald Trump.

Russia however, isn’t seeking to resolve the Kurdish issue, but rather is using it as a strategic card to strengthen its influence in the Middle East, through a network of interests extending to the Red Sea, Africa, and the Gulf states.

In contrast, there are some facts the contradict this direction, as on the reality of a large Russian military presence in Qamishli, the still US control in the region makes it unrealistic for Russia to move forward without international coordination.

Russia had previously been present in several location in northern and north east Syria, such as Ain Issa, Tal Tamr, and Ras al Ain within the framework of coordination with the SDF to separate them from the Turkish army, but building a permanent base or transferring large forces to an area under the control of the international coalition seems contradictory to the actual balance of power.

Thus, the future of Russian influence in Syria remains subject to rapid changes amid regional and international competition over areas of influence.

Despite the challenges, Russia remains determined to maintain a strategic foothold in the country, whether through an alliance with the SDF or through new arrangements with the ruling authority in Damascus.