Foreign Affairs: How the Houthis Outmaneuvered the United States
After seven and a half weeks of intensive airstrikes on more than a thousand targets, the US administration’s bombing campaign against the Houthi group in Yemen ended as abruptly as it began, even though the group still has the potential to threaten the global economy.
Quite simply, as Foreign Affairs magazine notes, US President Donald Trump declared that the Iranian-backed Houthis don’t want to fight anymore and that the United States will keep its word and stop bombing.
Omani Foreign Minister Badr bin Hamad al Busaidi confirmed on X that his country had brokered a ceasefire agreement between Washington and the Houthis, and that both sides had agreed not to target each other.
Although Houthi attacks are highly effective against international shipping in the Red Sea, particularly against Israel—as the magazine explains in a lengthy report by April Longley Alley—the agreement doesn’t explicitly restrict Houthi actions against any country other than the United States.
What is striking and puzzling, according to the Foreign Affairs, is the absence of Israel and its associated vessels from the agreement, and that the White House announcement came despite the fact that the Houthi position hasn’t fundamentally changed since the Trump administration began its escalating air campaign on March 15.
When Washington launched Operation Rough Rider—as it calls it—to restore freedom of navigation in the Red Sea and re-establish deterrence against Iran and its proxies, the Houthis openly targeted Israel and its associated vessels, not American vessels, indicating that they would continue to do so until Israel ended its war in Gaza.
Since the beginning of the US campaign, Houthi leaders have made it clear that they would cease attacks on US ships if Washington halted the bombing, but their attacks on Israel would continue.
Following Trump’s announcement of the May 6 agreement, Houthi spokesman Mohammed Abdul Salam reiterated this position.
In other words, the Foreign Affairs magazine notes, after a US military operation costing more than $2 billion and expected to have a far-reaching impact on the Houthis’ military capabilities, the ceasefire only served to entrench the group’s original position, with the group describing the agreement as a “victory for Yemen,” despite Trump’s claim that the Houthis had “surrendered”.
The Foreign Affairs magazine noted that the ceasefire provided the Trump administration with a swift end to an increasingly difficult campaign, as the bombing wasn’t only costly but also raised concerns that the United States could slide into another endless war in the Middle East.
It was supported by Vice President J.D. Vance and members of the administration more inclined toward neo-isolationism.
Indeed, the Trump administration was right to seek a way out of an increasingly costly and open-ended air campaign, but the option it chose could do more harm than good, according to the Foreign Affairs magazine, unless Washington quickly coordinates with its allies in the region, particularly Saudi Arabia, because the group will continue to wreak havoc in Yemen and across the region.
Foreign Affairs believes there is a better alternative, as the United States could, through the support of the United Nations, mediators like Oman, and its allies in the region and beyond, push for a broader political settlement in Yemen that would limit the Houthis’ military capabilities and ambitions.
The Foreign Affairs newspaper reported that the strikes on the Houthis began under President Joe Biden, whose administration pursued a measured strategy that limited itself to responding to Houthi attacks without escalating the conflict.
Trump was more aggressive, sharply criticizing Biden for his pathetically weak response to the Houthi threat.
He launched the largest and most costly military intervention, accompanied by a series of economic and political pressures, designating the Houthis a foreign terrorist organization.
Although the US strikes temporarily changed the Houthis’ military calculus, the US tactical gains came at an increased cost and significant risk, with the potential for US military personnel to be killed and increased damage to civilians and civilian infrastructure.
The Foreign Affairs magazine noted that the United States could limit its military involvement and support a process toward a settlement, or at least contain the Houthi threat, by working with its allies to exert military, economic, and political pressure on the group.
To ensure some balance on the ground in Yemen, the United States should provide the Gulf states that support the Yemeni government, such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE, with the security guarantees necessary to continue supporting the government politically and militarily, even though they have declared that they are not interested in rekindling the war.
By offering security guarantees to Riyadh and Abu Dhabi, Washington has effectively pledged to protect its allies, allowing them to strengthen local anti-Houthi forces and thus increase the chances of reaching a balanced power-sharing agreement.
This is especially true given that the US withdrawal has disappointed Yemeni government forces, and that the growing economic hardship and internal political conflicts threaten the collapse of the government, leading to the expansion of the Houthis and possibly the reemergence of al-Qaeda in government areas.
The Foreign Affairs magazine concluded that a sudden halt to US intervention would only embolden the Houthis and would likely exacerbate the security threats Washington sought to address.
They now reserve the right to strike ships linked to Israel, and, having experienced the power of seizing cargo ships in the Red Sea, may be tempted to use this tool again in the future for political gain.
