An Israeli general reveals five scenarios regarding Iran

Israeli Major General (Res.) Tamir Heyman outlined five future scenarios, from most dangerous to least dangerous, following the 12-day confrontation with Iran.

Tamir Heyman considered the operation, dubbed “Rising Lion,” on Iranian territory to be one of the most important battles, stating, “There is reason to be satisfied, but there is also a need to analyze the battle professionally and calmly: Have we achieved our goals? Has the existential threat truly been removed? Has our security situation improved substantially? Or are we facing an event reminiscent of past rounds against Hamas—an example of tactical superiority and strategic failure?”

Heyman addressed the method of execution and the elements of deception in the battle, saying, “Unlike the reactors in Syria and Iraq, the Iranian nuclear program doesn’t rely on a single plutonium reactor that can be destroyed to completely disable the program… A long campaign, encompassing a large number of operations, is required here… For this purpose, time and operational flexibility were essential… Therefore, a surprise operation was planned to paralyze the command and control system, achieve air superiority over Iranian airspace, and maintain freedom of action that would allow for significant strikes against all components of the nuclear program”.

The Israeli general also highlighted the achievement in the face of the nuclear program, explaining:

Eliminating enrichment capacity within Iran: “If Iran wants to enrich uranium beyond 60%, it will have to build a new enrichment facility… Before the war, all it took Iran was one week from the moment it made the decision to reach military-grade enrichment… Today, thanks to the campaign’s achievements, it will take several months”.

He added: “Currently, Iran doesn’t have the capacity to reconvert enriched uranium into metal, but the technology required for this purpose is relatively simpler than the rest of the process… Its estimated that if carried out hastily, secretly, and without safety restrictions, it would take several months (less than a year), but full recovery would take much longer”.

Knowledge Centers: The sweeping elimination of the program’s most prominent scientists removed the program’s most competent and dangerous people from the fold, complicating matters… There are good scientists in Iran, but it’s difficult to find talented individuals capable of managing a complex project like developing a nuclear weapon… Recruiting replacements, training them, and building a new team for the program will take many months.

In his words, “The conclusion – achievement versus nuclear” is, “Iran is no longer a nuclear threshold state (meaning that the time required to rush towards nuclear weapons has become longer than the time required for Israeli intervention)”.

Iran could return to the status of a nuclear threshold state within one to two years of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s order to rush to weapons—unless there is external intervention.

The urgency and planning (detailed description of the structure, components, and planned mechanism of action) of the explosive device will determine the recovery time.

Theoretically, there is an extreme scenario in which Iran could achieve the capability to conduct a nuclear test in less than a year.

However, this scenario is intended to project power without threatening operational capability, and would likely lead to a comprehensive US-Israeli strike on Iran.

Regarding achievement versus ballistic missiles, Heyman said, “Half of Iran’s ballistic missile capabilities have been reduced as a result of the destruction of military factories, the physical destruction of missiles, and Iranian launches… As part of its efforts, Israel has succeeded in slowing Iran’s future capabilities in this area, but over time, this military-industrial sector will be rebuilt”.

Heyman, who was called up during the war with Iran to serve in the Military Intelligence Directorate (Aman), spoke about “five future scenarios, from the most dangerous to the least dangerous,” summarizing them as follows:

Rapid Rush to the Bomb: Iran is pursuing a nuclear weapon at top speed.

This scenario will materialize if Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei concludes that the only solution is a full nuclear breakout.

It has the 60% enriched material and the necessary know-how.

Recovery would take several months, but it may take a risk.

The result: Iran becomes a pariah state, prompting the United States and the international community to act against it, and a direct nuclear threat.

A nuclear agreement as a ruse to conceal a secret project: signing an agreement, but simultaneously building a secret nuclear capability.

Since the leader was humiliated by the start of the war, he might agree to sign a nuclear agreement, but its effectively a deception.

The result: an intelligence and operational challenge to Israel and the West, and an economic lifeline for the Iranian regime.

A small risk for Khamenei to the public, who may see it as a sign of weakness.

No agreement, no attack, and Iran’s slow rebuilding as a nuclear threshold state:

The result: the imposition of harsh new sanctions, possibly by the Security Council.

The weakening of the Islamic Republic and the potential for the regime’s downfall in the long term.

The major drawback: This could strengthen Iran’s incentive to acquire a nuclear weapon.

The question that will remain unanswered: What will come first—the regime’s downfall or a nuclear Iran?

Nuclear Waiver: A Real Nuclear Deal with Sincere Intentions.

In this scenario, the Supreme Leader decides to abandon the nuclear program completely, perhaps because it threatens the regime’s stability, and prefers to strengthen the economy and domestic politics through a comprehensive and just nuclear agreement.

The result: an excellent scenario, but one with very little chance, because it contradicts Iran’s foundations and compromises Iranian dignity after the double humiliation (from Israel and the United States).

Regime fall: Regime fall is unpredictable.

It’s a popular, societal event that requires mass mobilization.

Such processes (for example, the fall of the Assad regime) are difficult to predict.

It’s likely that at some point, an underground movement will emerge demanding freedom and human rights, and may overcome the forces of the regime.

While this may take years, it could happen very soon.

Conclusion: This is Israel’s dream scenario; its likelihood is incalculable.

The prevailing assessment among researchers is that, despite its weakness, the regime remains stable, but this assessment must be treated with caution.

A summary: The campaign against Iran was necessary at the current time.

The operation’s objectives were achieved, and in the short term, Israel’s security situation improved.

However, in the long term, the threat hasn’t disappeared.

It appears that Iran will remain the primary source of threat to Israel (barring a change in the regime).

Therefore, we must continue to prepare to confront the Iranian threat.

Deterrence and intervention capabilities must be developed to thwart any nuclear drive.

At the same time, a nuclear agreement between the United States and Iran shouldn’t be ruled out—provided its undertaken with open eyes and adherence to the red lines (no enrichment allowed, strict controls including on weapons-grade components, and no sunset clause).

Post-war Iran is a weaker state, but it’s still extremely dangerous.

A new Israeli policy is required that suits the new situation: a policy that balances the willingness to repeat strikes to maintain the achievement, and a framework agreement that restrains and prevents Iran from approaching nuclear weapons.

In his opinion, “The future of the Middle East will be determined by the outcome of the strategic competition between three non-Arab civilizations in the region—Iran, Türkiye, and Israel—in organizing their relations with the Arab states, led by the Gulf states… In this regard, Israel may have succeeded in creating a relative advantage for itself after the campaign, but exploiting this advantage is dependent on ending the war in Gaza”.