Yedioth Ahronoth: Will Iran join Hezbollah in an all-out war with Israel?

The Israeli Yedioth Ahronoth newspaper published an article by Nadav Eyal entitled “Will Iran Join Hezbollah in an All-Out War with Israel?”

Eyal began his article by referring to fears of an Iranian attack in support of Hezbollah in light of the increasing prospect of an Israeli military operation in the north.

The worst part is that Israel and the United States don’t have a coherent plan in the absence of an agreement on the release of hostages held by Hamas.

After Washington’s support for Israel for nearly seven months, longer than any other Israeli war in the past, President Joe Biden has his own political considerations, and the most acute problem is that the United States, regardless of the election, doesn’t have a long-term strategy for dealing with Iran and its regional allies.

If Hezbollah continues to fire in the north and Israel goes into a wider war there, how can intense fighting continue in the south, given the IDF’s manpower and limited reserves?

If the IDF launches a ground invasion inside Lebanon and Hezbollah takes a blow, will Nasrallah stop and cut the knot linking Gaza to Lebanon?

The army and Defense Minister Yoav Galant are determined to try to send tens of thousands of Israeli residents back to the north before the school year begins in September, and this requires a determined attempt, military or otherwise, to stop Hezbollah attacks.

The first is a ceasefire and a truce, a possibility that the IDF considers unattractive, meaning that the war in the south stops, Hezbollah stops firing in the north, or some kind of deceptive compromise, such as Hezbollah withdraws to a distance of 8 kilometers.

Israel has been on the ground since the eighth of October.
The second possibility is to reach an agreement in the south, including the return of hostages, and to use this window to start a military operation in Lebanon, and the IDF prefers this option because the agreement would free forces from the south, but the political feasibility of this happening is low, as those who stop the war in the south won’t usually do so to start a more difficult war in the north.

There will be no agreement in the south, but the war there will essentially end, and the IDF will move troops and resources to the north with the aim of a short operation that would severely damage Hezbollah and lead to its withdrawal from the border.

In such an operation, Hezbollah is expected to launch thousands of relatively heavy and precision rockets across the north, Haifa and beyond, and even as both sides, Israel and Nasrallah, identify their target, Israel is expected to experience unprecedented levels of destruction, and Western intelligence agencies estimate that Iran is likely to join and attack Israel in a large-scale war with Hezbollah.

If it’s assumed so far that Hezbollah will join if we attack Iran, then there is a conclusion that Iran will join if we attack Hezbollah deeply, and other challenges to consider are reports that the United States continues to delay the arrival of munitions to Israel, so far, and these munitions are essential for the war in Lebanon.

The perception within the Israeli security establishment is that there is a major tactical achievement, which could be amplified if a new military campaign is needed in the north, pointing to a state of enormous concern within the Israeli military about new threats and the convergence of distant fronts, especially Iran.

Major fears that Gaza could become a black hole, attracting the most important powers to Israel, while severe threats continue in the east and north, and this would continue to cause enormous diplomatic damage, including strained relations with the United States and exhausting Israeli military forces.

Eyal concludes his article by pointing out that the Israelis have once again fallen into the trap of endless procrastination, which distinguishes the current Israeli prime minister, because he doesn’t make any decision until it becomes necessary, and sometimes too late, a method that the writer described as serving Netanyahu politically throughout his long career, but what suits him politically isn’t in Israel’s strategic interest, Netanyahu has never been a warlord, and it’s clear that his ability to maneuver politically isn’t enough.