The Washington Institute for Near East Policy: Bin Salman may surprise the world with “Black Swan”!

Syrializm Analytics
A surprising moves including intervention in Oman, regime change in Qatar, and deepening relations with Russia.
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy has reviewed a number of decisions taken by Saudi Arabia since King Salman bin Abdulaziz al Saud was crowned four years ago.
The Institute said in a report on its website published last week, the initiatives of Saudi policy since King Salman, attributed to his son Prince Mohammad bin Salman was characterized by speed, and its sudden impact on outsiders Saudi society, it can even be described almost as “Black Swan”, which cannot be predicted.
“While it can be said that the challenges facing the Kingdom require sharp changes, many new policies remain unforeseen”. The report said.
The report also cited internal events: the detention of princes and businessmen at the Ritz-Carlton Hotel in Riyadh on charges of corruption, the announcement of a partial offering of Saudi Aramco shares to the IPO since its postponement, and restrictions on public entertainment (such as theater).
He also cited the proposal to build new “international standards” resorts to encourage foreign tourism, give women the right to drive, and advocate a more moderate Islam.
The decision of the war in Yemen in March 2015, the severing of relations with Qatar, its freezing with Canada, the arrest of Lebanese Prime Minister Saad Al Hariri and the execution of the Saudi Shiite Sheikh Nimr Al Nimr, which led to the severance of diplomatic relations with Iran.
“In this sense, the kingdom’s allies and adversaries must consider other important decisions that Prince Mohammed bin Salman may make in the future, and perhaps reconsider the events that were previously considered to be of little chance”.
The Institute warned of foreign policy prospects, such as publicly expressing support for the American which is unpublished yet, peace plan between Israelis and Palestinians, possibly including a meeting between Prince Mohammed bin Salman and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.
The opposite may be taken by condemning the American peace initiative.
It is possible to deepen the oil relations with Russia, buy large Russian weapons systems such as S-400 surface-to-air missiles, and buy Russian or Chinese nuclear plants instead of US technology, most likely by the lack of restrictions on enrichment or reprocessing, And publicly cooperate with Pakistan on nuclear weapons.
The Institute adds to the list of possibilities: intervention in the Sultanate of Oman to ensure the future of the country after the death of Sultan Qaboos bin Said, who is currently deteriorating his health, or in Qatar to force Prince Tamim al Thani to abdicate and demand the opening of a road passage or a way to export oil through Yemen or Oman towards the Indian Ocean.
In another report, the Institute notes that the partnership between America and Saudi Arabia is in fact more focused on protection or defense, and is designed to be less focused on promoting US objectives than addressing negative scenarios.
“It is not Washington’s inability to do without Riyadh’s help, it is afraid of the consequences of losing influence over Riyadh’s regional and foreign policies, or, worse, destabilizing the kingdom”.
To avoid further instability, according to the Institute, such an approach must include four elements.
Washington needs to cleanse its diplomatic work with Saudi Arabia.
Saudis, and across multiple US administrations, often enjoyed access to the Oval Office in the White House and US government ministers.
The Institute stresses that the next stage, these actors should allow the US ambassador and US officials in the region by limiting their direct contacts with Riyadh to prevent “diplomatic differentiation between jurisdictions” and ensure a coordinated American approach.
In limiting the number of decision-makers and simplifying the relationship, the selection of General John Abizaid, Washington’s ambassador to the Kingdom, must be quickly established and enabled him to provide tailored personal guidance to the Saudi leadership.
Second, Washington should insist that Riyadh appoint officials without the position of King and Crown Prince and give them sufficient power to be able to deal with US officials.
A few points of contact must weaken the bilateral relationship.
One person cannot be expected to pay enough attention to the whole range of issues that the United States and Saudi Arabia need to face together.
Thirdly, the United States must make it clear that arms sales and other forms of US support do not depend on a common perception of threats but on a common strategy to counter them.
While the differences between the two sides will continue, US support must be the result of common goals and strategies, not something similar to the test of Washington’s loyalty to partnership or toughness toward Iran and other adversaries.
Likewise, Washington should make more efforts to consult with Riyadh and other regional allies before major initiatives that affect the region’s security landscape, such as the nuclear deal with Iran or changes in US policy in Syria.
Finally, the United States must complement its bilateral diplomacy with Riyadh with revitalized regional diplomacy.
Other regional allies have a greater stake in Saudi Arabia’s stability and regional policies than the United States.