The National Interest: What did Donald Trump do wrong?

Donald Trump wants an international coalition to defend the Strait of Hormuz.

He should have thought about it before launching an attack on Iran, according to Author Edward Salo in the National Interest.

“One of the most famous quotes about alliance wars is Winston Churchill’s quote: “There is nothing worse than fighting with the Allies, except fighting without them”.

As the war with Iran continues to escalate, the current Trump administration is beginning to recognize the wisdom of the British prime minister.

The biggest strategic mistake for the United States in a conflict with Iran will not be military, but diplomatic: failing to form an alliance before the first shot is fired.

One of the most prominent problems that emerged in the war was Iran’s closure of the Strait of Hormuz, one of the world’s most vital waterways, through which 20% of the world’s traded oil passes.

This turmoil has already led to chaos in global energy markets and the international economy as a whole.

US goals now include maintaining freedom of navigation in the strait and deterring any further Iranian interference in commercial shipping, while avoiding a broader regional escalation of the conflict.

These objectives require not only military capabilities, but also a sustained international presence to ensure the continuity of maritime security operations.

The Trump administration’s request for allies to participate is not just an attempt to gain political legitimacy for the operation, but an operational necessity.

Many US allies initially hesitated; German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius said: “This isn’t our war; We didn’t start it”.

Italian Deputy Prime Minister Matteo Salvini also said: “Sending warships to a war zone means entering war”.

Now, as attacks on energy infrastructure in the Persian Gulf escalate, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Japan have collectively expressed greater openness to keeping the straits safe.

The Trump administration, however, is frustrated by the incomplete support and has even called on China to help, undermining previous US rhetoric about countering Chinese influence in the region.

Regardless of one’s interpretation of the Trump administration’s logic in recent military action against Iran, White House strategists have clearly overlooked key alliance-building lessons from two previous conflicts, World War I and the Gulf War.

By conducting military operations without first forming a strong coalition, the administration has weakened its strategic position, undermining the legitimacy of its actions and its ability to influence postwar outcomes.

The Trump administration is now risking diminishing US influence by requiring China and other countries to retroactively join the alliance.

Giving China a seat at the table to shape the postwar Middle East order furthers its great-power ambitions and harms US interests.

It also suggests that the United States is forced to rely on its allies for military operations, which contradicts the image of the unilateral decisive actor established by successful military operations in Venezuela.

Rather than forge an impromptu alliance too late, the United States should have learned the lessons of the Gulf War.

President George H.W. Bush and his national security adviser, Brent Scowcroft, recognized that the United States needed a broad alliance to fight the first major military conflict after the Cold War.

Accordingly, the Bush administration formed an international coalition of 35 countries that participated in Operation Desert Storm in 1991.

Under a UN resolution to liberate Kuwait, the coalition included the United Kingdom, France, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and others.

While some States provided military support, others provided logistical and diplomatic support for the operations.

However, Scowcroft and others recognized the importance of forming an alliance before hostilities began to present a united front and ensure unity of purpose.

If the United States had formed an alliance after hostilities began, it would have exposed it to serious strategic risks, and it would have become a matter of concessions rather than coordination.

This would have limited Washington’s ability to exert control over the conduct of the war and the structure of peace, potentially weakening the postwar order.

The lesson of the Gulf War is clear: Alliances are most effective when they are formed deliberately and before any military action.

Any attempt to rally partners after the outbreak of conflict weakens strategic cohesion and diplomatic influence.

If the United States was seeking not only a military victory over Iran, but also the shaping of the region’s post-conflict political order, it should treat alliance-building not as an afterthought, but as a key element of strategy from the outset.

Ultimately, success on the battlefield is only half the war, and the other half is determining who makes the peace.

This conflict is often resolved before the war even begins.