National Interest: The Final Countdown in Ukraine

The period between now and the November US elections will be crucial to the outcome of the war between Russia and Ukraine.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky met with President Joe Biden and Vice President Kamala Harris in what may be the most momentous moment since Russia’s military operation in Ukraine began more than 900 days ago.

There are several questions that need to be answered until the US election is decided: Can the Ukrainian military hold its defensive lines in eastern Ukraine?

Will the Russian military use concentrated force to break through Ukrainian defenses before winter?

Will the United States and other NATO allies allow Ukraine to use the weapons systems they provide to strike deep inside Russia?

Can the Western defense-industrial complex get enough equipment into the Ukrainian supply pipeline in time?

And last but not least, who will win the US presidential election and be inaugurated in January 2025?

Despite these looming deadlines, Zelensky hopes that the United States and its partners will stop the clock.

The theory of victory is based on two assumptions.

First, Russia cannot sustain its efforts in the long term, and second, if the West commits to a rapid and massive resupply effort for the Ukrainian army, accompanied by strong security guarantees, the Russians will be forced to admit that they cannot crush Ukraine in a war of attrition.

The heart of Ukraine’s victory plan shifts the center of gravity from the battlefields of eastern Ukraine to Russia’s war-making capabilities.

Ending the conflict requires Ukraine to have the ability to disrupt Russia’s ability to manufacture and deploy its arsenal before it reaches Ukraine.

This requires not only Western permission to use NATO-provided systems but also sufficient equipment to deliver rapid and significant strikes.

It also requires more specific Western security guarantees to reduce the risk of future Russian escalation.

It’s no coincidence that Russian President Vladimir Putin announced changes to Russia’s strategic nuclear orientation precisely during Zelensky’s visit to the United States.

Putin asserts that if a non-nuclear state strikes Russia with a massive attack using capabilities provided by a nuclear state, Moscow reserves the right to consider this an existential threat to its deterrent capabilities and may respond accordingly.

Zelensky and Putin, in their own way, are demanding that the United States and the West define and clarify what they mean when they say they will do what it takes to see Ukraine’s victory.

The Biden-Harris team will now have to answer several key questions.

First, do they accept Zelensky’s theory of victory?

Do they accept the possibility of launching major sabotage strikes on Russian military sites, facilities and logistics centers as a means of ending the Russian offensive and forcing negotiations on Russia?

Second, do they take into account the Russian president’s statements that using Western systems in this way opens the way for escalation?

Third, can the United States—alone or in coalition with its allies—provide the level of security guarantees that Zelensky seeks without a treaty that would require Senate approval or NATO consensus?

And would Kyiv and Moscow take any such executive agreement seriously, given the legacy of the Budapest Memorandum, among other things?

Finally, do they have confidence that the Western defense-industrial complex will take the latest tranche of aid—which is now shifting from supplying Ukraine with US stockpiles to providing Ukraine with the financial resources to buy directly from companies—as sufficient incentive to increase production?

Another question is whether support for Ukraine is actually a major issue in the US election.

Does Vice President Kamala Harris see more voters joining her because she supports Ukraine?

And will former President Donald Trump—who in recent comments suggested that Ukraine should have accepted previous deals including the 2022 Istanbul Format criteria —lose support?

Biden will postpone answering these questions until after the November 5 election, when he can take action without affecting the election of his successor.

Moscow, for its part, will do everything it can to change the facts on the ground in the coming weeks.

It remains to be seen who will seize the moment first.