Institute for War Studies: Russia may deploy its ground forces in Syria

Russia may deploy conventional ground forces to Syria to gain influence in negotiations with Turkey and possibly participate in a Syrian army military offensive.

Russia and Turkey are pressing each other for concessions in negotiations over the Idlib province held by terrorist groups headed by Hay’at Tahrir al Sham, the formerly known as al Nusra front.

A conventional Russian military deployment remains unlikely, but several indicators have faltered in the past few weeks; This indicates that Moscow may prepare for this.

Such a deployment would represent a turning point in Russia’s participation in Syria and an escalation in the conflict between Russia and Turkey.

Study’s aspects:

Turkey and Russia are seeking influence to create the conditions for a new round of negotiations over the fate of Idlib Governorate, with the continued stalemate there as the Russian-Turkish negotiations on Idlib on September 16, 2020 did not result in a settlement, and Turkey later strengthened its military positions in the province, where Russia and the army stepped up.

Syrian air strikes, bombing and infiltration attempts, and Russia will likely seek a Turkish withdrawal from parts of southern Idlib to enable the Syrian army to launch an offensive against terrorist forces, without Turkish intervention, while Turkey is likely to seek concessions in other theaters of Russian competition.

Turkish, such as northeastern Syria, Libya and the Caucasus.

Turkey has important military advantages in Idlib, as the Turkish armed forces have military units with the size of a division (more than 20,000 soldiers) in Idlib, and Turkey also maintains large forces that support them in Idlib.

But it is possible that Russia or Turkey will not want a major military confrontation in Idlib, as Russia fears losses in units of the Syrian army in which it has invested heavily, such as the 25th Special Task Force (also known as the Tiger Forces) and the Fifth Corps, and the forces will also suffer.

The Turkish and Turkish-backed losses, given the artillery and air capabilities of the Syrian forces, in addition to this, Turkey would risk losing land in Idlib, and perhaps most importantly, losing access to the Russian concessions it hopes to achieve in the negotiations, and therefore the goal of deploying the unit is likely Russian traditional is forcing Turkey to compromise in negotiations rather than engage in combat, although it would be willing to do so if needed.

The limited and inconclusive indications, which are still noteworthy, stalled that Russia was preparing to deploy conventional forces in Syria.

The Russian Foreign Minister, Sergey Lavrov, stated on September 21, 2020, that “there is no need for the Syrian army and its allies to launch any attack on Idlib.

It is only necessary to target “terrorist” sites and eliminate their only remaining outpost on Syrian territory.

The clear rejection of the offensive operation in the first sentence is matched by coded language in the second.

Lavrov stressed that Turkey is primarily responsible for the counterterrorism mission in Idlib, and had previously accused Turkey of failing to fulfill its responsibilities in this mission, and Moscow justified the previous attacks of the Syrian forces in Idlib on They are counterterrorism operations.

Russia’s deployment operations have so far been limited to headquarters and air units and small numbers of Russian special forces, military police and military contractors, with one exception, as the 810th Marine Infantry Brigade was deployed to establish and defend the Hmeimim Air Base in 2015, and participate in limited offensive operations on the lines.

The front lines are close, but Russia stopped that procedure in 2017.

Russian media statements issued in Syria and the announced maneuvers preparing to operate in a chemical warfare environment are another vague sign of potential plans to deploy Russian conventional forces, and the Russian Reconciliation Center in Syria had confirmed on 11 November.

September, September 20, September 28, and October 13, that Hay’at Tahrir al Sham was planning a false chemical attack in Idlib, then this claim was spread through Russian and Syrian official media.

Several Russian units participated in the Caucasus-2020 training and lightning and unplanned exercises to counter (chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear) attacks, and a Russian infantry battalion trained to work with chemical weapons isolation equipment, including gas masks, on September 19.

Another battalion trained on clearing and clearing the ground using equipment and weapons on October 16, and it is worth noting that Russia is conducting many exercises of this kind, but the size and nature of these exercises are more noteworthy in recent periods, especially when they are combined with the ongoing media operation in Syria.

The recent moves of the Syrian army and Russia may indicate that the Syrian forces are preparing for an attack on Jisr al Shughur, which is an important area for defending the coastal base of Russia.

On September 20, 2020, Russian air strikes targeted a command center and several warehouses belonging to the militant “Guardians of Religion” organization, where fighters are concentrated.

Guardians of Religion “mainly around Jisr al Shughur, just as the Syrian army bombed a Turkish observation post near Jisr al Shughur on September 20 as well, and Russia launched air strikes against opposition forces near Jisr al Shughur on October 14, as the city is considered a fortified urban center controlled by the opposition and threatening the security of the Russian Hmeimim Air Base and the Lattakia governorate countryside, and Russia considers Hmeimim one of its three permanent bases in Syria and is currently working to expand its facilities.

Russia has supported the Syrian army’s multiple attempts to control Jisr al Shughur since 2015 through the mountainous regions to the southwest of the city, and the Russian conventional forces, with their broader capabilities, may be able to succeed in the missions that the Syrian forces could not undertake, and the gains of the Syrian forces in southern Idlib From late 2019 to March 2020, conditions have been set for the attack on Jisr al Shughur from the flat land east of the city, as the Syrian forces will control the al Ghab Plain and cross the Orontes River to reach the city, and it is likely – based on the position of the Syrian forces that the opposition-controlled areas south of the road The M4 highway, including the al Ghab Plain, is a likely target of an incoming attack by the Syrian army