Foreign Affairs: Can Russia Divide Europe?

The European Union announced, last month an agreement under which the EU countries will reduce their gas consumption by 15% during the next eight months to avoid a crisis in the winter.

The reduction in gas consumption is voluntary, and the impact of gas shortages is not equal for everyone.

Six months into the war in Ukraine, there are indications that Europe is struggling to stay on the path of an increasingly costly war.

With soaring inflation, a worsening energy crisis, and the growing threat of recession, European leaders are becoming more vocal about the social and economic fallout of the war and its political and geopolitical implications.

At the same time, there are simmering tensions over how to deal with this war.

Germany, for example, has slowed down on promised arms shipments to Ukraine.

In Italy, the coalition government of Prime Minister Mario Draghi has fallen, and there is growing political opposition to military support for Kiev among populist parties.

Despite the rapid approval of five packages of sanctions, Europeans spent weeks wrangling over a sixth package targeting Russian oil, which was halted by Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban, the EU’s autocrat.

Amid these challenges, a larger question looms over how long European unity on war can last, and what might cause it to unravel.

In fact, the biggest threat to the European alliance may not be the lack of progress in stopping the war, but rather Moscow’s ability to entice some EU countries into pressuring Kyiv to make concessions, especially if the energy crisis continues to fester.

Paradoxically, by giving in to the illusion of peace, Europe and the West may end up prolonging the war at everyone’s expense.

During the early phase of the war, the EU showed remarkable determination: Brussels agreed to tough sanctions in record time, European governments increased their defense spending, granted protection and freedom of movement and work to millions of Ukrainian citizens across the bloc, and facilitated arms transfers to third parties (for the first time).

But the momentum in Brussels is waning, the oil embargo on Russia, for example, will occur with a time lag that may allow it to adjust.

Despite the recent gas agreement on energy savings, a real gas ban is not on the horizon.

In fact, it was Moscow that turned off gas in Europe, then six countries (Bulgaria, Denmark, Finland, Latvia, Poland and the Netherlands) boycotted the Russian supply.

Moreover, Russia’s Gazprom has drastically reduced the flow of gas to the rest of Europe.

Nordstream-1 has been shut down for maintenance, reducing gas exports to 20% of agreed volumes, with more disruptions on the horizon.

The European Union today seeks to address the problem of gas storage, and is struggling to legalize its use.

To diversify its supply, it is seeking new energy partnerships with the United States, the Middle East, Africa and the Caucasus.

The International Monetary Fund estimates that in the event of a complete cut off of Russian gas from Europe, the economies of some countries, including the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, and Italy, it can shrink by more than 5%.

In short: it will be a cold and costly winter.

The mounting economic pressures are beginning to have troubling consequences.

In countries such as Italy and France, populist and right-wing nationalist parties use the costs of the war to mobilize popular support.

They claim that by punishing Russia and adopting the Green Agenda, European governments and EU institutions are fueling inflation, emptying industry and destroying jobs…

Indeed, in the French presidential elections (April), the far-right and far-left parties performed strongly; This is the result that was repeated in the parliamentary elections (June).

Even more dramatic was the fall of Mario Draghi in Italy in July, after parties with close ties to the Kremlin withdrew their support for the coalition government of which they were part.

These events may just be a prelude to what is to come.

Many populist parties have taken their cues from the Kremlin’s playbook, and have adopted rhetoric that contradicts their actual intentions.

Rather than admitting that they want to throw Ukraine under the bus, leaders of populist parties (such as Italy’s Matteo Salvini) say they support peace, compromise and diplomacy.

The Ukraine war, along with the energy crisis, has given populists the perfect opportunity to rise again.

Over time, this dynamic will create a new surge in nationalist populism that could jeopardize not only European unity but the very existence of the EU as a whole.

Even more worrying for Europe is the resurgence of old geopolitical divisions.

The first is the growing divide between the east and west of the continent, the countries bordering Ukraine, such as the Baltic states and Poland.

It calls for justice through sanctions and strong military support for Ukraine.

While the countries of Western Europe, such as Italy, France and Germany; Lean towards accommodation with Russia (statements of French President Emmanuel Macron on the importance of not humiliating Russia).

As the energy and economic crises deepen, countries far from the front line are likely to back off the war.

Eastern European leaders will likely remain convinced that peace can only be achieved when Ukraine successfully expels Russian forces from its territory and holds Russian President Vladimir Putin responsible for his aggression.

The second divide runs between north and south, the one that nearly tore the eurozone apart during the sovereign-debt crisis a decade ago.

With the possibility of stagflation in the short term, the difference in borrowing costs between member states in the north and south of the union, particularly between Germany and Italy, is rising.

France, Spain and Italy; which has less room for fiscal maneuver to weather the recession.

It is calling for a new initiative from Brussels to increase the Post-Pandemic Recovery Fund and help deal with the economic costs of the war, including the cost of energy transfer.

But Germany; Which depends more than others on Russian gas; Its energy prices, which have tripled, are unlikely to support such a move.

The German government is likely to invite EU members to help alleviate Germany’s energy crisis, rather than providing its own financial resources to help other members’ economic problems.

These divisions are exactly what Putin had hoped for.

Convinced that Europe’s liberal democracies are morally weak and corrupt, the Russian president has relied on the premise that the West’s unity over Ukraine will and may collapse in the coming months.

By playing a “cat-and-mouse game” on gas, creating a global food crisis by blocking the export of Ukrainian grain through the Black Sea, and pursuing a scorched-earth strategy in Ukraine, Putin may bet that it is only a matter of time until the West is dismantled, starting with Europe.

Moscow is well aware that sanctions are inflicting severe damage on it, and that the damage will only increase over time, Putin has publicly acknowledged this.

The energy crisis is the most severe since the 1973 oil embargo, but Russia has enjoyed high oil and gas prices.

With Europe being “weaned off” from Russian fossil fuels, it will eventually emerge stronger from this crisis.

Both by diversifying its energy sources and accelerating its transition to clean energy.

By contrast, despite good relations between Moscow and Beijing, it will take years for China to replace Europe as the market for Russian hydrocarbons.

For a variety of reasons, China is unlikely to be as profitable to Moscow as Europe was.

In addition, Russia’s long-term economic future is bleak.

Putin should realize this fact, but his calculations are likely that Europe will break first, given its fragile unity.

And that the internal pressures on the continent will allow him to achieve his war goals in Ukraine, and perhaps, sooner or later, return to business as usual with Europe, or at least with some of its countries.

As the Kremlin sees it, Europe’s divisions and vulnerabilities may prevent a long-term scenario in which Russia bears the strategic, economic, and political costs of its invasion.

With each additional month of war, the danger of European division grows, and the first alarming signs have already appeared.

But much will depend on the course of the conflict itself.

If Russia continues its war the way it has for the past six months, European leaders can count on Putin to keep them united… Europeans are unlikely to turn away from a bleeding Ukraine.

But it will be more difficult for Europe if Putin changes; out of necessity, not choice; His tactics in Ukraine.

By the fall, Russia may simply lack the military capacity to continue the military offensive.

Some Western intelligence agencies believe that Russia is paying a very high military price… and estimate that more than 15,000 Russian soldiers have died since February 24.

These losses are likely to increase even more as Ukrainian forces receive high-quality Western weapons.

However, this does not mean that the Kremlin’s goals have changed… Putin won’t be satisfied with some territorial gains in the Donbas.

With increasing pressure on the Russian military, the Kremlin will likely have to adapt its strategy… In the coming months, according to the relative depletion and reconfiguration of the Russian military power.

Thus, the greatest danger that European leaders face is a hidden one: if Russian operations in Ukraine subside and Moscow begins hinting at some kind of accommodation or armistice, Europeans could fall into a trap.

Although such a possibility presents itself as an opportunity to seize, it is likely to be an insidious threat.

For Moscow, it will be just a way to buy time to prepare for the next round of fighting in a few months.

And if some countries support such a move, it could further divide Europe, even if the Kremlin helped prolong the war.

When the violence subsides, the West must show its true resilience and redouble its support for Kiev, not only to ensure that Russia loses, but also Ukraine wins.

Nevertheless, the temptation to seek accommodation with Russia is strong, especially given that it is likely to occur at a time of heightened social, economic, political, and geopolitical pressures on the continent…, And European leaders may be forced not only to argue and waver, but to split altogether.

In moments of calm, European leaders will face new challenges to maintain pressure on Russia, and they will no longer be able to count on their unity.

Europe’s path through its series of crises over the past few decades illustrates this perfectly.

Including the sovereign debt crisis, immigration, Brexit, and the Covid pandemic.

The war in Ukraine, and the way it will test Europe’s defenses, economies, energy systems, and democracy, may be the hardest test of all.

To pass this test, the Europeans will need to prove their determination and strength.