June 18, 2026

Yedioth Ahronoth: They are the illusion of toppling the Iranian regime

0
89008796568799080

The Israeli Yedioth Ahronoth newspaper published an analysis of Israel’s failure in the war with Iran, saying that despite the extensive military strikes that Iran has been subjected to since the outbreak of the regional confrontation, there are growing signs in Israel that the overthrow of the regime in Tehran is not an imminent or guaranteed scenario.

“The Israeli military establishment itself is beginning to speak more concrete language, acknowledging that its goal is to undermine Iran’s military capabilities rather than to force sweeping political change,” Yedioth Ahronoth added in its analysis.

The Israeli newspaper continued in its analysis by saying that statements of the Israeli army spokesman, Effie Defrin, in which he stressed that the overthrow of the regime isn’t a direct objective, reflect a shift in the strategic mood within Israel.

After weeks of touting the possibility of a decisive strike, there is talk of destroying missile platforms and disrupting military production as a realistic alternative to regime change.

This shift isn’t a technical detail, but a tacit acknowledgement that the current war, while intense, doesn’t have the tools to reshape power in Iran, according to Yedioth Ahronoth.

The Israeli calculations are based on the fact that the Iranian regime, led by the new Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei, still retains key elements of power in the form of cohesive security apparatus capable of controlling the street, a deep institutional structure within the state and society, and the ability to conduct the war through a network of regional allies.

While some estimates speak of the possibility of protests, historical experience suggests that external military pressure often strengthens the cohesion of regimes (especially in countries such as Persian Iran) rather than topples them.

Observers say weakening the economy doesn’t necessarily mean the fall of power, but could open the door to a protracted war of attrition and greater regional expansion.

Although there is continued talk in political and security circles about the possibility of pushing the Iranian street to move against the authority, this option remains fraught with a great deal of uncertainty.

External calls to take to the streets collide with a complex internal reality, influenced by the atmosphere of war and the military danger to society.

Past experience has also shown that protests, even when they erupt, don’t necessarily turn into a force capable of effecting change.

Therefore, the idea of relying on a popular uprising in Iran seems more like a theoretical bet than a practical scenario with guaranteed results.

The statement of IDF Spokesperson Effie Defrin reflects the extent of the reluctance to bet on the Iranian street worker, as he implicitly acknowledged that the decision to act remains in the hands of the Iranians themselves.

This statement reveals a clear gap between the political discourse that threatens the possibility of changing Iran’s interior, and the more cautious military assessment, which believes that igniting a popular uprising cannot be guaranteed or controlled, even as external strikes and pressures escalate.

In parallel, there is an indicator that topples the Iranian regime is currently an almost impossible task: the absence of a broad ground intervention or a strong international coalition similar to what happened in Iraq in 2003.

Air warfare, no matter how intense, alone cannot force a radical change in the governance structure of a country as large and relatively cohesive as Iran, and Western officials and military experts see a ground intervention in Iran as a grave risk, costly, and uncertain outcome, especially with Iran’s control and control of the geography of land and sea.

The reality that Israel is beginning to deal with is that the most that can be achieved is a long-term weakening of Iranian capabilities, not a decisive political victory.

This means that the war may turn into an open-ended confrontation, managed by the logic of reducing risks rather than achieving decisiveness.

The overthrow of the regime in Iran today seems more like a political slogan than an actionable military plan.

Strikes may wound the regime but not kill it, and may push it to harden and expand rather than collapse.

In this complex balance, a strategic paradox emerges: the longer the war goes unresolved, the more the idea of toppling the regime turns from a declared goal into an unattainable burden.

Share it...

Leave a Reply

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *