Foreign Affairs: About Trump’s lost adventure in Iran
The course of the US-Israeli war against Iran is shrouded in mystery, as many major questions related to its causes, goals, and consequences remain unanswered by the administration of US President Donald Trump.
How will the war end? And what are the ultimate strategic implications of this adventure?
A war without clear political goals threatens to exhaust the United States militarily and deplete its resources, while Iran may emerge more determined and determined to develop its nuclear capabilities, and a short-term military show will become a cause of long-term regional and international destabilization, according to the Foreign Affairs.
The history of US military interventions offers a recurring lesson that wars that begin without clear and specific political goals, or are disputed, often end badly.
Every possible tactical success raises many questions about the next step, and setbacks become a justification for further escalation.
Thus, the war expands and prolongs, and the original justification for it is reduced.
This is summed up by the 19th-century Prussian military theorist Carl von Clausewitz when he said, “When there is no clear political goal, war can become an end in itself”.
US President Donald Trump’s goals in launching the war against Iran aren’t clear at all.
At first, it was declared that the main objective was regime change.
He even called on the Iranian people (in a video posted on Truth Social) to govern themselves, saying, “This may be your only chance for generations to come”.
But in the days that followed, the positions and statements of officials in his administration seemed contradictory and contradictory: Is the goal to install an acceptable government like Venezuela? Or the imposition of unconditional surrender?
Or the destruction of Iran’s nuclear program? Or, simply, to weaken those who survive and remain in power, rendering them incapable of extending their military influence and declaring victory? Clearly defining goals is key, because regime change, regime behavior, destruction of Iran’s nuclear program, or weakening Iran’s military power and influence in the region.
Not all of them are just different formulas for a single goal, as each option requires a different kind of war, the resources it needs, the time frame, the definition of the desired victory, and even the way to plan for the post-war phase.
That ambiguity has been reinforced in recent days as Trump has sent conflicting signals about the duration of the war.
On Monday, he tried to calm markets and curb a sharp rise in oil prices, by hinting that the US military was too ahead of schedule and that the war might soon be over.
But just hours later, he retracted his words: “We’ve won many victories, but they aren’t enough,” he told a crowd of Republican lawmakers, adding, “We’ll move forward with greater determination than ever to achieve a final victory that puts an end to this long-standing danger… And forever”.
This ambiguity puts the US military in a real dilemma, as reports that US intelligence officials see regime change in Tehran as unlikely.
But what if the Iranians seize the historic opportunity that Trump says he has given them, and the regime decides to respond to them with violence? History offers grim warnings in this regard. After the 1991 Gulf War, former US President George H.W. Bush encouraged Iraqis to rise up, then stood by and watched them as Iraqi President Saddam Hussein violently suppressed them and killed thousands.
In Libya in 2011, the Obama administration did the exact opposite, intervening to protect civilians who had defied leader Muammar Gaddafi, but regime change in Tripoli ended with the collapse of the state and the outbreak of civil war.
Today, if the Iranians rise up and are repressed by the regime, Trump will find himself faced with a similar dilemma: either remain neutral at great cost to US credibility, or fully engage and risk expanding the scope of the military mission, becoming more involved, and spreading chaos indefinitely.
Rather than confront the dilemma of the lack of clear and explicit goals, the Trump administration seems to be exacerbating it.
With the prospects for regime change diminishing in the near term, both the United States and Israel appear to be thinking about fueling internal division as an alternative plan.
The CIA is reportedly arming Iranian Kurdish militias in northern Iraq, while the Israeli air force is bombing border posts, police stations and military sites along the northern border between Iran and Iraq to pave the way.
Trump recently hinted that he was backing away from this plan, but Israel didn’t.
Indeed, Israeli leaders seem to view the destabilization plan of Iran as the preferred reserve option in the event that regime change is impossible (Netanyahu’s recent speeches backtracked on the option of toppling the regime due to its difficulty).
If such a plan succeeds, it could push Iran into a pattern of disintegration that has seen Libya, Syria, and Iraq.
In a country of 90 million people at the crossroads of Eurasia, such a disruptive scenario would be extremely dangerous in terms of destabilization, not only for the Iranians, but also for US interests in the region and beyond.
Even if the war ends tomorrow, several important strategic questions and implications will remain.
The most prominent of these is the Iranian nuclear issue, where the real concern about the uncertainty about how to achieve Trump’s goals of destroying this program is highlighted.
Last June, IAEA inspectors estimated that Iran had more than 400 kilograms of uranium enriched to 60% purity—a quantity of fissile material that, with further processing, would be enough to produce about a dozen nuclear bombs.
After Israeli and US strikes on Iran later that month, the IAEA was no longer able to confirm the size or location of the stockpile.
No one knows exactly where hundreds of kilograms of semi-nuclear fissile material are located, and of course no one has any idea how to control it… This is simply the reality!
Iran may emerge exhausted from this war imposed on it, but it will certainly come out more determined and determined to harness its remaining nuclear capabilities to deter any future attacks.
This problem cannot be addressed by new and repeated rounds of bombing.
In the absence of a large number of US or Israeli troops on the ground to secure these materials, a risky option that Trump is said to have considered, the administration will need to develop a practical monitoring plan after the end of the current aggression, focusing specifically on locating and securing Iran’s existing stockpile of fissile material before any side can use it to manufacture nuclear bombs.
But this is precisely the kind of diplomatic strategy that becomes impossible to develop when the ultimate goals of war remain undefined.
In addition to questions about the immediate goals of the US-Israeli aggression against Iran, larger questions are emerging regarding the repercussions of this aggression on US interests around the world.
Prior to the aggression, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Dan Caine expressed serious concerns that a widespread, protracted conflict in the Middle East would deplete vital US munitions and weaken US readiness to respond to threats in other regions.
The early days of the current war confirmed these fears… The United States has already exhausted large quantities of long-range munitions, modern and sophisticated air defense systems, and sophisticated air defense interceptors that were used to protect US bases, Gulf states, and Israel from a barrage of Iranian missiles and drones.
With US munitions stockpiles dwindling, and the defense industry base struggling to ramp up production fast enough to meet needs in any potential future contingencies with China or Russia, the Pentagon risks a costly victory, as success in Iran could reduce the US ability to deter or defeat any major aggression elsewhere.
These challenges are compounded by the prospect of tens of thousands of US troops remaining in the Middle East for months or years, constrained by postwar tasks of containing Iran, reassuring anxious Gulf partners, and the requirements for periodic attacks when Iran inevitably tries to rebuild its military forces.
This is exactly what happened in the aftermath of the 1991 Gulf War, which established a permanent US military presence in the Middle East under the pretext of containing Saddam Hussein, and still exists today.
Today, Washington may sink directly into quicksand again, this time the quagmire will be Iranian, from which the war’s supporters claim they are fleeing through the aggression they want to end what they say is a threat to US national security.
There is a painful paradox here… The US military parades have been spectacular, and adversaries will no doubt notice it.
But the United States may emerge from this war militarily exhausted, exhausted, and unable to position effectively, and thus weaker in the face of China and Russia for years to come.
The most important question may be what this war means for the future system of international relations.
This year, the United States launched two major military operations — against Venezuela and Iran — without broad international alliances, UN mandate, or a solid legal basis, and the administration didn’t get a congressional vote, nor did it provide the American people with any convincing justification, not even the kind of flawed and erroneous justification it deployed to promote the Iraq war in the months leading up to the 2003 invasion.
Leaders in Moscow and Beijing are closely watching the course of events, not because they oppose the idea of eliminating the regime in Iran… but because the US willingness to act unilaterally, without adhering to traditional legal constraints, makes it extremely difficult for Washington to uphold a firm moral position if Russia further aggression against its neighbors or if China moves to invade Taiwan.
Every standard Washington violates now is one that it cannot force others to respect in the future.
Wars are judged not by how successful their beginning is, but by their end, and by whether the country that started the fighting is stronger or weaker when the guns are sounding.
US forces carry out their missions and lead today’s combat operations in Iran with high professionalism, but this doesn’t compensate for the lack of clarity of purpose.
The questions that are being asked very quietly at the moment are the same ones that will ultimately determine whether this war is worth fighting.
