Türkiye… NATO and the new scenario
By: Bruno Beaklini – MEMO
Less than two weeks after the earthquake that severely hit Türkiye and Syria, tensions in Ankara’s axis of power continue to grow.
The background theme is in the title.
The republic founded by Mustapha Kamal Ataturk may leave the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance Organization (NATO) and this possibility turns the whole power game in the Middle East and Islamic World.
The direct consequence can be very positive, with the breaking of relations with the Colonial Apartheid State in Occupied Palestine (commonly the State of Israel).
Such a measure would meet a stabilized position since the previous decade, pointing out that more than 86% of the Turkish population has a negative view of the Zionist entity.
If the exit from the western alliance actually occurs, it will completely change the scenario of geopolitics of global influence (thus, becoming Geostrategy) and also in the domestic scenario of Türkiye.
In the first case, control over the physical access to the Black Sea, through the presence of the Turkish navy in the Bosphorus and Dardanelles straits, equivalent to NATO’s naval presence at the other end.
In the Strait of Gibraltar, England controls one end of the Mediterranean’s outlet to the sea – explicitly violating the sovereignty of the Spanish State.
This, in turn, violates Moroccan sovereignty, as in the enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla, the Francoist heritage is present, helping the crusader navies in Arab seas.
The other dimension is domestic, because if that decision is taken, it will immediately redirect the preferences of Western countries, pointing the batteries against the AKP, Erdogan’s party.
Today, the greatest possibility is for a great alliance between the heirs of Kemalism (CHP and IYI, their most recent split in 2017) with the Leftist Party of Kurdistan (HDP) and possibly this coalition will enjoy the sympathy of all Western countries.
Evidently, if this relationship takes place, the account to be settled will immediately be not to leave NATO and even less to allow the breaking of relations with Israel.
It’s difficult for the MHP, the extreme right-wing party that claims the governments of the military junta (following the Turkish dictatorships of 1960, 1971 and 1980, in addition to the confused proto-coup of 1997), to form an alliance with its direct opponents.
Uneasiness with the US
In July 2016, Türkiye experienced a classic coup attempt, with an uprising of military units and Ergenekon networks.
It’s important to explain that these networks are a kind of secret lodges where judges, prosecutors, military commanders, businessmen, financiers and influential people come together to meet strategic objectives.
The manipulator behind the failed coup was Reverend Fethullah Gülen, exiled in the US and commander of an empire of “beneficial” entities, through the Hizmet system (the service), at the head of universities, schools, hospitals, care centers and dissemination.
The mimicry capacity of the FETO network – commanded by Gülen – is in fact quite advanced.
Therefore, the presence of members and followers of the “reverend” in key positions in western countries, including the United States, is considerable.
The sum of the problems listed so far, plus the tensions of a pre-election moment, add to the evident social instability arising from the 2023 earthquake.
The perception of the Ankara cabinet that Washington is betting on a change of command in Türkiye is more than realistic.
Not to mention the reserved reports from MIT (Turkish intelligence service), which show the presence of US espionage in the region, in addition to its strategic ally, the European invaders in Palestine.
A Critical and Complex View of Erdogan’s Türkiye
Any somewhat more consistent analysis of Erdogan’s policy must separate the domestic scenario (and the key theme of Kurdistan), Turkish security policy (counting the presence in the Aegean Sea, the projection of power in Libya and the dangerous rivalry with Greece) and its foreign policy based on the classic tripod: Neo-Ottomanism, pan-Sunni (aiming at an Ummah in the 21st century) and pan-Turkic (affirming the strategic dimension in the post-Soviet space of Turkic culture and Islamic majority).
Without these elements, it’s not possible to minimally understand the Türkiye of this century, and even less to make the necessary criticism.
Recep Tayyip Erdogan comes to power still in the parliamentary format in 2002.
It was the rise of a new business layer, far from Istanbul’s financial square and getting rid of the utilitarian relationship of Kemalism with Sunni Islam.
The AKP (Justice and Development Party) promised to combine Islam with economic modernity and governmental efficiency.
Luckily, in the previous period, Türkiye was denied entry into the European Union (for clearly Islamophobic reasons), maintaining the autonomy of the Turkish lira and without being subordinated to the European Troika (the joining of the European Central Bank, the European Executive Commission and the IMF) under German hegemony.
Drastic events, such as an earthquake prior to his coming to power and the attempt to place Türkiye in its own space in the International System, radicalized his government.
That’s why I insist on the need to separate the levels of analysis.
The most delicate situation is undoubtedly the military presence in northern Syria, claiming the need for a buffer territory to avoid expanding the Turkish left’s scenarios of action.
On the other hand, little is seen of this same Erdogan office regarding the complicity of the Irbil government (seat of the Iraqi Kurdish regional administration) with Israel and the United States.
The leaders of the two largest Kurdish clans, the leading oligarchs of the Talabani families and the most important one, the Barzani, operated under a Kurdish diplomatic passport until the second US invasion of Iraq.
Nor can we hide that coordination with imperialist special forces is no longer exclusive to the Kurdish right, but also to their insurgency, operating from Rojava and Qandil.
The immediate perception is that Türkiye can act of its own accord, being a leader in the majority Islamic world (with a Sunni majority), having the same weight and scope that Iran has for Twelfth Shiism, its expansion and close allies.
Ankara and Doha, representing the strategic alliance with Qatar, could change the “balance” of power in the Gulf and, by extension, in all oil, gas and derivatives routes.
Washington X Ankara
It’s clear that the analysis carried out in this text is almost an evidence and in fact it is a priority for the strategists of the Pentagon and the US State Department.
The “bipartisan Washington hawks” need to avoid, at all costs, the presence and performance of a Türkiye focused on the interests of countries with an Islamic majority and leaving any alliance with the West in the background.
The truth is that the US needs Türkiye’s presence in NATO more than the other way around.
If the exit from the Western alliance were to consolidate, it would be like a historic revenge for the Treaty of Sèvres and an authentic reversal of the accursed legacy of Sykes-Picot.
If Erdogan and his cabinet decide resolutely to withdraw from the military pact with the crossed military forces, the history of the 21st century will be changed definitely, with the scales turning in favor of countries and territories with an Islamic majority.
